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Abstract In this paper, I explore the question of how the costs of undertaking an
important type of climate change mitigation should be shared amongst states
seeking an environmentally effective and equitable response to global climate
change. While much of the normative literature on climate mitigation has focused
on burden sharing within the context of reductions in emissions of greenhouse gas, I
explore the question of how the costs of protecting tropical forests in order to
harness their climate mitigation potential should be distributed amongst developing
and developed states. In response to this question, I outline and defend a ‘benefi-
ciary pays’ account of forestry mitigation burden sharing that requires affluent states
to finance measures supporting avoided deforestation while less affluent states,
within whose territory these forests tend to be located, implement these measures.
The normative basis for this account, I argue, is a principle of ‘unjust enrichment’
according to which developed states must bear much of the cost of avoided
deforestation for its climate mitigation potential because of the huge economic
benefits their citizens have accumulated from productive activities that have con-
tributed to climate change.
Keywords Climate justice  Global justice  Free riding  Beneficiary-pays
principle  Unjust enrichment  Fair reciprocity
Introduction
Global climate change poses a severe threat to the welfare and security of present
and future generations. Increases in global temperature and sea-level, and changes
in the frequency or intensity of extreme weather events, will amplify existing global
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inequalities given that the populations most vulnerable to these changes will be
those residing in developing states (IPCC 2014, p. 69). In response to such threats,
the governments of over 190 states are now committed to adopting a mix of policies
with the objective of ‘avoiding a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system’ (UNFCCC 1992, p. 9; IPCC 2014, p. 84). These policies can be
usefully separated into ‘mitigation’ (to limit the extent of climate change by
controlling sources, and enhancing withdrawals, of the gases that cause climate
change), ‘adaptation’ (to adjust human behaviour in order to reduce the disruptive
effects of actual or expected climate change), and ‘loss and damage’ (to compensate
vulnerable populations that endure adverse effects of climate change that cannot, or
will not, be prevented through policies of mitigation or adaption). Although policies
of adaptation and loss and damage have become an increasing focus of normative
analysis, climate change mitigation remains a pre-eminent concern of climate
justice theorists (Caney 2012, 2014; Blomfield 2013, 2016; Armstrong 2015).
In this paper, I address the challenge of determining how the financial and
managerial burdens associated with undertaking a crucial form of mitigation
should be shared amongst states committed to a global response to climate
change. While much of the normative literature on climate mitigation has focused
on how the burdens associated with reducing fossil fuel emissions should be
distributed internationally, I explore here the question of how the costs of
preserving and enhancing naturally occurring processes that withdraw greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere should be distributed. I do this by exploring a novel
approach to climate change mitigation requiring affluent states to finance measures
designed to exploit the mitigation potential of tropical forests whilst poorer states,
whose territory these forests occupy, implement these measures on a day-to-day
basis. The normative basis for this approach to mitigation burden-sharing, I argue,
is a ‘beneficiary pays’ principle of climate change justice according to which
developed states should bear the financial costs of tropical forest-based mitigation
policies implemented within the developing world to reflect the huge amount of
benefit that agents operating within their territories have accumulated from
productive activities since the beginning of the industrial revolution that are now
known to cause climate change.
In the next section, I briefly outline the science of forest-based mitigation and the
normative puzzle it poses for climate justice theorists in terms of fair burden sharing
amongst rich and poor states. I then go on to explore how a ‘beneficiary pays’
account of climatic burden sharing might be used to solve this puzzle by, firstly,
comparing it to two rival burden sharing accounts and, secondly, by exploring two
versions of the account (the ‘policy beneficiary’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ accounts). I
go on to argue that the ‘unjust enrichment’ account is superior to the ‘policy
beneficiary’ account in the way it resolves the problem of burden sharing raised by
forest-based mitigation and also that thinking of burden sharing in terms of unjust
enrichment has advantages over rival perspectives such as ‘ability to pay’ or
‘contribution to problem.’ The penultimate section briefly responds to three
objections to the ‘unjust enrichment’ account and a final section provides a brief
summary of the paper.
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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
The Earth’s forests play a key role in the global policy response to climate change
due to the critical role they play in the process through which accumulations of
greenhouse gas are stored in the Earth’s atmosphere (Pan et al. 2011, p. 992). The
climate mitigation potential of forests is based on two pathways: the enhancement
of greenhouse gas removals and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Smith
2014, p. 816). In terms of emissions reductions, land use changes in global forests
(primarily through forest clearing for agriculture, pasture and timer production) are
a major component of these emissions (Pan et al. 2011, p. 991). Forests also release
carbon into the atmosphere through natural processes of tree respiration, decom-
position, and forest fires—and these natural processes are all influenced by human
practices such as the conversion of forests into agricultural land, logging, and
expansion of settlements (Nabuurs and Masera 2007, pp. 544–545). It has been
estimated that forest-based emissions account for between 12 and 20 per cent of all
global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as a result, it is widely
acknowledged that emissions from forestry must be reduced significantly if
‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ is to be avoided (Van Der Werf et al. 2009,
pp. 737–738). In terms of enhancing removals, the Earth’s forests store huge
amounts of carbon as a result of processes of photosynthesis that transform carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere into biomass (UN-FAO 2010, p. xvii; Nabuurs and
Masera 2007, pp. 564–566). Forests also store substantial amount of carbon in soil,
dead wood and litter (Pan et al. 2011, p. 989). Forests, in removing significant
amounts of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere, provide a unique ‘ecosystem
service’ in the way they constrain processes of climate change when managed
effectively (Nabuurs and Masera 2007, pp. 564–566). As much as 15 per cent of
global annual emissions of carbon dioxide, for example, could be sequestered by
forests through preserving existing forest cover (Pan et al. 2011, p. 992). Tropical
forests, in accounting for roughly 70 per cent of carbon sequestered each year by the
Earth’s forest cover, have a particularly important role to play in climate mitigation
policy (UN-FAO 2012, p. 14).
Policies designed to reduce forestry emissions, and enhance the carbon
sequestration function of tropical forests, will involve significant costs accruing to
those agents who undertake and finance these policies. Without international
intervention, much of this cost will fall on the developing world since a substantial
proportion of the remaining forest cover is located within low-income states that
depend on forests for their economic development. Tropical forests located in
developing states in South America and Africa, for example, accounted for over half
of the total amount of carbon stored in the world’s forests in 2010 (UN-FAO 2010,
p. xvii). This special geopolitical feature of forestry-based mitigation raises a
significant puzzle of climate burden sharing since forest-based mitigation will
require significant investments within developing states (in institutional capacity,
capital investment, and development of new forestry technology) whereas the
benefits of exploiting the mitigation potential of tropical forests will be shared by all
states.
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The normative questions raised by policies to exploit the mitigation potential of
tropical forests, though distinctive, otherwise mirror quite closely the general
features of established climate burden sharing debates in that we can ask which
agents should bear what types of burden if the burdens arising from implementation
of these policies are to be justified. The burdens at the centre of the tropical forest
mitigation problem, which for simplicity I will refer to as costs of ‘avoided
deforestation’, are a mixture of direct and indirect costs accruing both locally and
internationally (Smith 2014, p. 864; Armstrong 2015, p. 2). Direct costs include the
costs of implementing policies that increase forest area, reduce deforestation, and
maintain existing forests. They also include the costs associated with developing
and implementing new forestry protection mechanisms at the international level,
such as the United Nations REDD ? initiative (Smith 2014, p. 864). Indirect costs,
meanwhile, extend to the ‘opportunity costs’ of avoided deforestation such as
forgone development opportunities of developing states that sacrifice economically
productive activities that would otherwise impair avoided deforestation policy (UN-
FAO 2012, p. 14).
The Beneficiary Pays Principle of Burden Sharing
Who should bear the predictable direct and indirect costs of exploiting the climate
change mitigation potential of avoided deforestation? If we reject the idea that
duties to manage tropical forests to exploit their climate mitigation potential fall
exclusively upon the states where these forests are located, the literature supplies
three alternative burden sharing principles that could solve this problem (Caney
2010; Page 2011). Here I interpret each as an account of the duties that states, rather
than the agents that operate within their borders, owe to each other in respect of
climate change mitigation burden sharing.
According to the ‘beneficiary pays principle’ (BPP), states that predictably
benefit from policies designed to reduce the risk of ‘dangerous anthropogenic
interference’, or from activities that created the environmental damage changes that
these policies are now designed to address, should shoulder the principal burdens of
financing, and where possible undertaking, mitigation policies. Each state, that is,
should contribute to the mitigation effort in rough proportion to how much it has
benefited, or will benefit, from the activities that caused climate change or policies
that address climate change. The unfairness of existing arrangements concerning
mitigation and avoided deforestation, on this view, is that developing states are
forced to bear much of the cost of these policies while developed enjoy the fruits of
the associated climate mitigation on top of the benefits they continue to enjoy that
are associated with productive activities responsible for driving climate change.
According to the ‘contributor pays principle’ (CPP), states should bear the costs
of managing climate change and its adverse effects in proportion to how much they
contributed to the emergence of the climate problem as measured by the cumulative
greenhouse gas emissions of each. The unfairness of present arrangements, on this
view, is that developing states, due to the disproportionately high tropical forest
cover located within their territories, bear the heavy burden of executing avoided
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deforestation policies while developed states, on average, bear a far greater
responsibility for climate change due to their greater share of cumulative
greenhouse gas emissions released into the atmosphere since the beginning of the
industrial revolution. The developed states should, therefore, take the lead in paying
for policies of avoided deforestation to reflect the fact that they took the lead in
releasing the greenhouse gas emissions that triggered the climate threat and
therefore the need for such policies to be adopted.
According to the ‘ability to pay principle’ (APP), the costs of mitigating climate
change should be borne in proportion to the capacity of each state to bear these
burdens as measured by national income, national wealth, institutional capacity,
mitigation capacity, or some combination of these metrics. The unfairness of present
arrangements, on this view, is that developing states bear much of the cost of
avoided deforestation policies while the institutional and financial capacity to
sponsor these policies effectively, and without serious hardship arising within the
sponsoring states, is disproportionately located in the developed world.
The strengths and weaknesses of the BPP, CPP and APP as principles of fair
burden sharing have been well covered in the literature (Caney 2010; Meyer and
Roser 2010; Page 2011). The APP and CPP continue to dominate the theoretical and
policy debate, particularly where the focus of the analysis is the duty of each state to
mitigate climate change through reductions in their annual greenhouse gas
emissions (Caney 2012, 2014). By contrast, my aim here is to explore how the
BPP may also offer a distinctive and persuasive justification for adopting policies
that enhance greenhouse gas withdrawals by separating the duty to finance measures
of avoided deforestation undertaken within developing states from the duty to take
operational responsibility for the implementation of these measures.
The BPP, as we shall see, can be developed either as an account of duties of agents
who have benefited from the productive activities that cause climate change (the
‘unjust enrichment’ BPP) or as an account of the duties of agents who will predictably
benefit from policies that aim to prevent climate change (the ‘policy beneficiary’ BPP).
Both accounts seek to explain why developed states should pay developing states to
protect the tropical forests under their control from deforestation. Where the accounts
differ is the way they approach the question of which benefits lie at the heart of the duty
of developed states to surrender (or ‘disgorge’) some of their current wealth to finance
policies of avoided deforestation and which agents enjoy, or will come to enjoy, these
benefits. In what follows, I argue that the BPP should be interpreted in terms of ‘unjust
enrichment’ rather than ‘policy benefits’ and also argue that understanding the BPP in
terms of unjust enrichment helps clarify certain advantages that the BPP has, in
theoretical and practical terms, over the APP and CPP.
Benefiting from Policies of Avoidable Deforestation: The ‘Policy
Beneficiary’ BPP
The climate change mitigation benefits of avoided deforestation will be unevenly
spread across states. All states will benefit to some extent, but some will gain more
than others in terms of reductions in economic disruption, morbidity and mortality
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relative to what they would have been had no climate mitigation response been
adopted. Although developing states, such as those home to large tropical forests,
will benefit from a weakening in all of the these pathways of climatic disruption,
developed states will also benefit greatly from reduced disruption to assets located
inside their territories. Due to geographical location, however, as well as historical
deforestation in developed states, a large proportion of the Earth’s remaining
tropical forests is located within the territories of developing states who cannot
afford to bear the burden of protecting these forests without sacrificing significant
development opportunities (Pan et al. 2011, p. 990). The mitigation benefits of
avoided deforestation, and the costs of undertaking avoided deforestation, are thus
out of alignment and this misalignment will continue in absence of a mechanism
that adjust the burdens of each state. According to the ‘policy beneficiary’ BPP, the
justification for such a mechanism is that the costs of enhancing withdrawals of
greenhouse gas through avoided deforestation should be shared amongst states
according to the extent that each is expected to benefit from these measures. Given
that the developed states have much to gain from (and the developing states
currently face disproportionate costs in implementing) measures of avoided
deforestation, the former should bear a much greater share of the financial cost
than they do currently if relations between these states is to be fair.
The ‘policy beneficiary’ BPP is essentially a global application of the principle of
‘fair reciprocity’ (Page 2007, pp. 227–228; Armstrong 2015, p. 4). According to this
principle, no agent can reasonably refuse to pay their fair share of the costs of
realizing a policy goal, or endeavor, that they and other agents have freely endorsed
so long as (1) other agents pay their fair share (or more than their fair share) and (2)
each agent continues to benefit, and other agents can reasonably assume that they
continue to benefit, from the realization of the policy goal or endeavor. The burdens
associated with undertaking measures of avoided deforestation, here, should be
shared out amongst states fairly and the extent to which each state is expected to
benefit from these measures is a key indicator, if not the only indicator, of how
much they should be prepared to pay. The basis of the duty to act is the connection
between the mitigation benefits delivered by avoided deforestation and the burdens
that these policies impose on those states that finance, and implement, these
policies. If, as in the case of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, (UNFCCC 1992), a number of agents have come together and declared that
they wish to contribute to a mutually valued cooperative venture then it would be
unfair for one or more of their number not to bear a fair share of the cost of pursuing
this venture while simultaneously benefiting from their international partners paying
their fair share. The geographical location of tropical forests is not, on this view, a
normatively relevant factor in the way that fair shares of costs of avoided
deforestation are distributed since duties are allocated by the ‘policy beneficiary’
BPP on the basis of benefits predictably received, and presumptively welcomed,
rather than on the location of the benefit producing practice.
The ‘policy beneficiary’ BPP has been endorsed recently by Chris Armstrong.
Armstrong argues that agents that predictably benefit from the avoided deforestation
efforts of developing states should bear much more of the financial burden of
undertaking these efforts than they do at present (Armstrong 2015, pp. 6–10). Such
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efforts, he argues, provide a valuable ‘ecosystem service’ of enhanced climate
mitigation that all states have reason to value and from which no state can be
excluded. Consequently, following the logic of the theory of public goods, any state
that fails to contribute its fair share to avoided would be impermissibly taking a
‘free ride’ on all other states that accept these costs (Armstrong 2015, p. 4). The
agents at the centre of Armstrong’s fairness–based approach to forestry mitigation
are developing world ‘producers’, and developed world ‘non-producing recipients’,
of benefits arising from avoided deforestation. The producers, as noted above, are
states such as Ecuador that face a unique dilemma where their international
commitments to tackle climate change impose costly burdens of avoided
deforestation that conflict with their domestic commitments to tackle poverty
amongst their citizens through productive processes that increase deforestation. The
beneficiaries are states, such as the United Kingdom, that enjoy a ‘free ride’ on the
benefits created by Ecuador’s avoided deforestation policy by refusing to pay their
fair share of the production costs of these benefits while their citizens continue to
profit from greenhouse gas emitting activities that make this novel form of climate
change mitigation necessary (Armstrong 2015, pp. 6–7).
In the useful terminology introduced by Gosseries (2004, pp. 43–46), the free
riding that Armstrong describes can be seen as ‘parasitic’ (harmful) rather than
‘benign’ (non-harmful) and is therefore doubly impermissible under the fair
reciprocity principle. Developing states, burdened by fortuitous location of tropical
forests within their borders, invest in avoided deforestation rather than economic
development with the side-effect being that their populations continue to suffer from
the global inequalities in wealth and power that can be traced to climate change
producing activities in the past. As Armstrong (2015, p. 6) puts it, ‘[developed
states] avoid sharing in the costs of provision [while exploiting] the difficulties of
enforcing payment and thereby oblige others, inappropriately, to subsidise [their]
own ends.’ Fulfilling the relevant duties, by contrast, would involve beneficiaries of
measures to avoid deforestation ‘paying their fair share’ of the cost of the valuable
eco-system service they predictably receive from avoided deforestation while
providing direct financing for avoided deforestation measures in states such as
Ecuador that request such financing. Alternatively, developed states might instead
invest in other forms of climate mitigation that have an equivalent effect in terms of
slowing, or reducing the magnitude, of climate change so that they would not be
‘free riding’ on developing states when they decline to invest directly in avoided
deforestation measures. Engaging in such ‘mitigation offsetting’ would close the
gap between how much a developed state benefits from, and how much it
contributes to, the global climate mitigation response as a whole (Armstrong 2015,
pp. 12–13).
On first inspection, Armstrong’s account offers a strong justification of
international policies of avoided deforestation currently under development within
the UNFCCC system that seek to close the gap between the avoided deforestation
policy burdens of developed and developing states. Nevertheless, significant
problems arise with the underlying idea that we can solve the avoided deforestation
puzzle merely by requiring states to cover the costs of these policies in proportion to
the benefits their populations predictably enjoy from their implementation. First, the
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‘policy beneficiary’ approach seems too charitable to states that, for reasons of
historical or geographical contingency, are less vulnerable to climate change and
hence have less to gain from policies of avoided deforestation. Such states might
conceivably enjoy higher levels of development than neighbouring states due to the
accumulation of the benefits of carbon based industrialization while also avoiding
many of the risks of climate change. It seems unfair to require a lesser sacrifice from
such states if they have high mitigation potential, as measured by current income or
wealth, particularly if they bear significant historical responsibility for climate
change as measured by their historical greenhouse emissions records.
Second, emphasizing the importance of restoring fairness amongst ‘producers’
and ‘recipients’ of policies that reduce the risk of dangerous anthropogenic
interference can easily lead to us ignoring a far greater injustice. This is that the
citizens of some states continue to enjoy huge benefits as a result of enjoying a
privileged position within an international system characterized by inequalities in
wealth, status, income and power—while others living in less privileged states
experience the negative consequences of these structural inequalities—that could
not have arose in absence of the activities responsible for driving climate change.
Acknowledging, and tackling, such inequalities requires an account of climatic
justice that seeks not merely fairness amongst future beneficiaries of climate change
policy but also to understand the injustice of existing institutional forms.1
Third, Armstrong’s focus on rainforest protection benefits ignores an important
stream of economic benefits that is even more closely connected to international
injustice at the heart of the climate change problem and the need to exploit forests
for their climate mitigation potential, namely, the benefits that arose from the
practices that drive climate change. Human activities have released in excess of one
trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent since 1750 (Boden et al. 2015). In the
same period, global wealth has grown to over 700 trillion dollars, with over 80 per
cent of this wealth now being in the hands of agents located in developed states
(World Bank 2011, pp. 182–183). Whilst the relationship between past greenhouse
gas emissions and present global wealth distribution is complex, it is clear that much
of current world wealth would not exist ‘but for’ the climate changing activities that
have underpinned international trade and growth since the beginning of the
industrial revolution. To deliver a comprehensive account of fairness in the
distribution of burdens of avoided deforestation, then, Armstrong’s account of
burden sharing must embrace this broader range of climatic benefits. Not to do so
would prioritize one sort of unfairness (unfairness amongst present and future
beneficiaries of climate policy) over another (unfairness amongst beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries of productive activities that change the climate system) without
argument. However, it is far from clear how Armstrong’s account could be
broadened in this way without compromising its distinctiveness as a wholly
‘forward looking’ account of burden sharing.
1 For further elaboration of the claim that citizens of developed states currently enjoy the benefit of an
advantageous position within an unfair global distribution of wealth and power that owes its existence to




Benefiting from the Causes of the Climate Change Problem: The
‘Unjust Enrichment’ BPP
According to the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP, developed states have a peculiarly strong
responsibility to finance measures of avoided deforestation because much of the
present income and wealth of their citizens can be traced back to activities in the
past that are still contributing to climate change. The duty of each state to surrender
a certain amount of the benefit under its control to finance avoided deforestation
measures flows form the impermissibly, in the present, of any agent retaining all of
the benefits it commands when at least some of these benefits can be traced back to
activities that impose unjustified burdens on other agents (Meyer and Roser 2010,
pp. 252–253; Page 2012, pp. 313–317; Butt 2009, p. 123).
The core argument proceeds as follows. The economic and social benefits that
have arisen as a result of activities that released vast amounts of greenhouse gas into
the atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial revolution have been spread
unevenly across states in both aggregate and per capita terms. These benefits can be
seen in the uneven global pattern of national wealth and income, as well as in
inequalities in a range of individual-level indicators of human development and
well-being. All states command benefits that can be linked in a morally relevant way
to the causes of climate change but developed states command a far greater
proportion of the wealth that is ‘tainted’ by the shadow of climate change than
developing states. A duty of justice requiring each state not to profit from human
activities that impose unjustified suffering on other agents means that each state
should be prepared to surrender (or ‘disgorge’) a certain amount of its wealth that
can be traced back to the anthropogenic processes that drive climate change in order
to mitigate the threat of climate change. Such disgorgements can be required until
the risk of dangerous anthropogenic interference has abated or the benefits traceable
to activities that drive climate change are exhausted. The refusal to disgorge in this
fashion would be to violate a duty not to benefit from the undeserved suffering of
others without contributing to the ending of this suffering. Implementing avoided
deforestation measures in the developing world, as we have seen, is a vital part of
the global climate mitigation response since it tackles the causes, and not merely the
effects, of climate change and so it is one of a number of key endeavors that should
receive support through this channel of funding.
For the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP, the focus of the duty to pay for avoided
deforestation is not on historical wrongdoing but on presently held benefits that
should have been shared with others more fairly if they should have been created at
all. As Klimchuk (2004), p. 1274 explains, ‘one can understand the unjust
enrichment claim as reaching no further than the impermissibility in the present of
the past justification for the impugned transfer.’ Unjust enrichments, although they
always follow some deviation from a just arrangement of resources, neither require
that we retroactively blame past generations for harms they had absolutely no way
of predicting nor identify specific past wrongdoers, or wrongdoing, in the standard
sense. It is merely unfair, and unjust, that the costs of avoided deforestation policies
accrue wholly to impoverished states when so much economic benefit exists in other
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states that can be traced back to the activities that generated the need for such
policies.
There are several reasons for thinking that the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP is a more
attractive interpretation of the BPP than its rivals while also retaining some general
features of BPP reasoning that finesse some disadvantages with the CPP and APP.
First, the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP identifies a potentially extensive revenue stream
for the funding of avoided deforestation without implying that all present-day
benefits should be surrendered for this purpose and without reducing mitigation
burden sharing to one of fairness amongst beneficiaries of mitigation policy.
Second, the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP coheres with the intuition that injustice arose
in the creation of the climate change problem but in a way that does involve blaming
the inheritors of benefits or seeking direct restitution or compensation from them for
the harms caused by climate change. Third, the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP provides a
deeper explanation of the intuitive principle that the rich states should shoulder the
primary burden of avoided deforestation even though the avoided emissions and
enhanced removals are under the territorial jurisdiction of other states: since the rich
states currently enjoy benefits that are not rightfully theirs in the sense that they
have not been justly produced and transferred through the generations, a principle of
strict liability arises for the disgorgement of the benefits. Fourth, the ‘unjust
enrichment’ BPP does not rely on a ‘thick’ cosmopolitan ethic (where national or
generational boundaries have no normative force) and therefore may be more
politically feasible and less morally controversial than the APP. To the extent that
unjust benefits will be transferred inter-generationally, and inter-nationally, this
account will advocate that different states bear different climatic burdens, but it does
not presuppose any strong duty to assist other states cope with disadvantages that
cannot be connected to the former’s income or wealth.
Three Objections
The preceding account has attempted to shift the focus of rainforest protection
burdens away from familiar principles of climate change burden sharing (such as
‘historical responsibility’ and ‘ability to pay’) towards the principle that the
beneficiaries of climate change should bear the financial burdens of avoided
deforestation in proportion to how much present benefit they enjoy that can be
traced to productive activities that alter the climate system. Whilst the ‘beneficiary
pays’ approach to burden sharing raises a number of normative puzzles in any
context (Pasternak 2014; Butt 2007), I respond here briefly to three challenges for
its application to the problem of avoided deforestation.
Questioning the Disgorgement of Involuntary Benefits
Properties of the process through which benefits were transmitted down the
generations to their present-day beneficiaries may seem to block the generation of
duties of fairness in many cases. Many benefits passed on by earlier generations that
would not have been created ‘but for’ the release of large amounts of CO2, for
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example, appear to have the quality that they could not have been refused by their
current owners. It might seem unfair, therefore, to require the current owners of
such benefits to disgorge (some of) these benefits for the sake of financing avoided
deforestation since this seems to involve holding the current beneficiaries
responsible for rectifying environmental problems that arose from activities that
created benefits that no owner received voluntarily. If this reasoning is correct, then
a developed state could, on behalf of its citizens, reasonably reject the request that it
surrender a proportion of its current wealth that can be connected to climate change
(its ‘climatic benefit’) to fund avoided deforestation measures undertaken in the
developing world even if developing states could be found that were willing to take
responsibility for operational control of the relevant policies. This is the problem of
involuntary (or ‘forced’) benefit (Meyer and Roser 2010, p. 243).
The involuntary benefit problem clearly has a bearing on what can legitimately be
asked of states on the basis of unjust enrichment. However, it seems an exaggeration to
say that it fatally weakens the unjust enrichment BPP. Successive generations have
inherited benefits for which they had little, or no role, in creating. They have also, since
the 1980s, when the basic science of climate change became well understood
internationally, continued to enjoy the benefits of industrialization without undertak-
ing significant measures of climate mitigation. It seems plausible, then, to argue that
for at least 30 years, in which time over half of the current stock of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas has accumulated, existing states have benefited knowingly from the
activities that cause climate change. It is consequently unclear how it could be
reasonably maintained that benefits in this period created by climate change
exacerbating activities have been ‘forced upon’ the present generation for, while the
benefits may have been involuntarily received in some cases, the retention of the
benefits appears all too voluntary. Next, it might be claimed that, even if each
generation has little opportunity to offer its explicit consent to the benefits it inherits
from the past, it does not seem plausible to argue that it would have declined to enjoy
the benefits of industrialization had it been given the opportunity given the huge boost
offered by these benefits in quality of life terms. Many benefits of industrialization
(such as increased longevity, sanitation, leisure time, material affluence) are
‘presumptively beneficial’ in the sense that they are so clearly an advantage to a
wide range of lifestyles that their acceptance can be treated as voluntary (Page 2007,
p. 237; Armstrong 2015, p. 10). Finally, while it might be questioned whether such a
hypothetical standard of consent should play any role in our account of climate burden
sharing, it is surely relevant that no more than a very select group of states have acted to
intercept the continuous line of benefits their citizens have enjoyed as a result of
activities that cause climate change since understanding of the problem become
widespread. The actual behaviour of beneficiary states since 1990 undermines claims
that they would have declined the associated benefits had they been given the choice
(Butt 2007, p. 151; Caney 2009, p. 209).
Questioning the Isolationism and Atomism of the Account
The ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP, drawing upon Simon Caney’s useful terminology, is an
isolationist and atomist account of climatic justice (Caney 2012, pp. 258–259). That is,
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it ‘isolates’ questions of climate change justice from other problems (or ‘spheres’) of
justice and ‘atomizes’ (or, in other words, further isolates) questions of climatic justice
concerned with mitigation from connected questions of adaptation, loss and damage.
Isolationist accounts will be viewed with suspicion by integrationist theories of
global justice (such as theories of equality, sufficiency, utility, basic needs, or human
rights) which hold that benefits and burdens arising from mankind’s shared use (and
abuse) of natural resources should be distributed in line with a preferred pattern of
justice and not a climate-specific burden sharing arrangement that could disrupt the
preferred pattern. The question arises, then, how the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP could be
rendered compatible with a range of views on the appropriate pattern of distributive
justice that should hold within and between generations. One response to the problem
of isolationism would be to claim that reasonable disagreement over the appropriate
pattern of global and intergenerational distributive justice means that endorsing the
‘unjust enrichment’ BPP would mark a reasonable compromise between rival moral
outlooks, including cosmopolitans and nationalists who disagree on whether natural
resources belong to the states in whose territories they are located. The ‘unjust
enrichment’ BPP finesses the problem of whether there is an ideal distribution of
benefits and burdens that would be more appealing than the present distribution by
emphasizing that, at present, many agents are committing an injustice by forcing
others to bear the costs of damaged by activities that have benefited these agents. As a
principle of corrective rather than distributive justice, the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP is
by nature ‘islolationist’ since it seeks to rectify a specific past injustice rather than
establish a new and favoured distribution of resources in some jurisdiction. However,
it is non-isolationist in the sense that the principles of unjust enrichment can be applied
in any sphere of human activity where benefits have been created and enjoyed by some
at the expense of others.
Turning to the ‘atomism’ of the account, it is undeniable that the ‘unjust
enrichment’ BPP is atomist in its handling of the duties associated with financing
and executing avoided deforestation measures since its account of duties is applied
to (one form of) climate change mitigation in isolation of climate change adaptation
or compensation. The account may be subsequently applied to these challenges or it
may not but this further application is not seen as relevant to its strength as an
account of just avoidable deforestation.2 This narrow focus might be justified to the
extent that it helps us develop a scientifically informed and policy relevant account
of one aspect of justice that can be later integrated with a broader account of what
users of the atmospheric commons owe to each other. However, it could be argued
further that the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP is hyper-atomist in the sense that it explores
fair burden sharing in the context of avoided tropical deforestation in isolation of
other terrestrial greenhouse sinks (such as the oceans and non-forest soils) as well as
other types of forest that sequester carbon (such as boreal and temperate forests).
Why treat fairness in the distribution of avoided deforestation in isolation of other
activities under human control that mitigate climate change? And how, if this
2 As Fabian Schuppert (2016) puts it usefully elsewhere in this issue, atomist accounts of just climate
mitigation such as the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP reject the claim that the duties of states to contribute to the




particular ‘eco system service’ is treated as unique and therefore requiring a unique
burden sharing solution, should it be integrated into a comprehensive solution to
mitigation, adaptation and compensation of climate change? There is an interesting
parallel here between the ‘policy beneficiary’ BPP and ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP
versions of the BPP. Armstrong suggests that the ‘policy beneficiary’ version can be
integrated into a broader account of climate change mitigation by permitting states
to choose how they fulfill their burden sharing duties either by financing forestry
sequestration in developing states or by undertaking some other mitigation activity
of equivalent effect that would not have been undertaken otherwise (Armstrong
2015, p. 13). This option of ‘mitigation burden offsetting’ also arises for states
bound by duties generated by the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP so long as these states
also recognize the existence of a deeper, residual, injustice, ignored by the ‘policy
beneficiary’ BPP, that the inhabitants of the developed world continue to benefit
disproportionately from an unequal distribution of global wealth and income made
possible by the pathway of fossil fuel industrialization now blocked to developing
states.
Identifying the Beneficiaries of Climate Change: The Non-identity Problem
One problem in linking a duty to contribute to the cost of avoided deforestation with
the receipt of the benefits of fossil fuel industrialization is that it might be objected
the activities that contributed to the emergence of climate change played a minor, if
necessary part, in the coming into existence of citizens of all states (Page 2011,
pp. 423–424). Few if any individual persons who currently live, then, can be
coherently be said to have benefited from past activities that cause climate change
since they could not have existed in the state where they did not enjoy these benefits.
The claim that the current denizens of developed states have benefited, unjustly or
otherwise, from climate change is, consequently, puzzling on standard accounts of
what it means to be benefited and as a result it seems unjust to require ‘enriched’
states to surrender ‘benefits’ enjoyed by their populations in order to preserve a
climate system untouched by the threat of dangerous anthropogenic interference. To
finesse this ‘non-identity problem’ by insisting that states are the subjects of climate
change justice and should therefore surrender climatic benefits under their control to
fund avoided deforestation does not solve the puzzle of how any agent can be
obliged to disgorge a benefit to tackle a social problem with which this benefit
shares a common origin if no beneficiary can be identified.
The non-identity problem raises complex issues far beyond the scope of the
paper, but there are reasons to doubt that it poses a strong challenge to beneficiary
pays reasoning in this context. Though it may not be possible to benefit someone by
bringing them into existence into an affluent society whose affluence has origins in
fossil fuel-based industrialization, it is still the case that benefits have been produced
and transferred over generations to generate this affluence. Members of less affluent
states which have not industrialized in this way can still say to their richer
neighbours: ‘you would not be enjoying these benefits if it was not for the carbon
emitting activities that caused the climate problem to arise that less privileged
agents such as myself now have to tackle through avoided deforestation within our
Qui bono? Justice in the Distribution of the Benefits and… 95
123
state and, as a result, you should surrender these benefits to the climate change
mitigation response.’ The unjust enrichment BPP can be conceived as a way of
transferring burdens between these two societies without being tied to the ‘person-
affecting’ requirement that acts and social policies are only permissible if they make
at least one individual person better off than they would have been. It may be true
that no individual in the developed world is better off than they would have been, all
things considered, had industrialization not occurred since they would not have
existed had it not occurred. However, the inhabitants of developed states are
undeniably currently in control of trillions of dollars of accumulated wealth—not to
mention political power and influence—that would not exist ‘but for’ processes of
industrialization responsible for climate change. A small proportion of this wealth,
according to the ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP, should be surrendered to fund measures
of avoided deforestation in developing states as this wealth owes its existence to
climate changing activities and not because the inheritance of this wealth from
previous generations made its current owners better off, or victims of climate
change worse off, than they would have been. The ‘unjust enrichment’ BPP is, in
this sense, a species of impersonal corrective justice in the sense that it requires
developed states to disgorge benefits that their citizens cannot rightfully retain to
correct an ongoing injustice with which these benefits share a common origin. It is
not a valid reason to resist such disgorgement, on this view, that no particular citizen
of a developed state could coherently be said to have benefited from being brought
into existence into a community whose affluence could only have arisen in a world
characterized by the threat of dangerous climate change.
Conclusion
One novel approach to climate change mitigation generating increasing interest
amongst policymakers and normative theorists involves developed countries
financing measures adopted within the territories of developing states to protect
and enhance natural processes, such as managed tropical forests, that withdraw
substantial amounts of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere so that they can play no
further role in changing the Earth’s climate. One normative justification of such an
approach is that developed states have benefited far more than developing states
from activities that cause climate change and so the former should bear a much
greater share of the costs of designing and implementing measures of climate
change mitigation, such as avoided deforestation, than they currently choose to bear.
In the paper, I investigated some of the normative questions that arise in making
sense of this ‘unjust enrichment’ account of climate change mitigation burden
sharing before defending the account against some prominent objections raised in
the literature.
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